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Abstract
In this paper we show that costs associated with infractions of
property rights, such as theft, can be reduced by imposing lower penal-
ties on individuals who admit to such infractions and make restitution.
We ￿nd that the socially optimal penalty on a confessed thief may be
zero (complete amnesty) or even negative - a person may be given a re-
ward for confessing a theft. The bene￿ts of amnesties were apparently
recognized in ancient times and they constitute part of Biblical Law.
Moreover, such amnesties have also been informally incorporated into
modern legal systems, wherein leniency (a form of partial amnesty) is
generally shown to individuals who confess their infractions.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent years there has been increasing interest in the economics of amnesties.
The literature in this area has focused on two main issues. First, there has
been much discussion of the role of tax amnesties.1 It has been argued that,
for a variety of reasons, tax amnesties may increase the amount of tax rev-
enue collected, even if the possibility of such amnesties brings about a greater
1See, for example, Malik (1991), Andreoni (1991), Marchese and Cassone (2000).
1amount of tax evasion in the ￿rst instance. Second, there has emerged a liter-
ature that analyzes the social bene￿ts of ￿self-reporting￿2 within the context
of environmental regulations. This work suggests that treating self-reported
infractions of environmental regulation more leniently that unreported in-
fractions may be socially bene￿cial.
In this paper we explore the potential role of amnesties in reducing social
costs created by infractions of property rights. We ￿nd that the imposition
of a lower penalty (a partial amnesty) on individuals convicted by their own
admission may raise social and owner welfare. Indeed, we show that the opti-
mal penalty may be zero (complete amnesty) or even negative - a person may
be given a net reward for confessing a crime. Our analysis, which is framed
in terms of theft and the return of stolen property has a distinguished pedi-
gree. Amnesties constitute part of Biblical Law, and their bene￿ts have been
implicitly recognized in ancient times. Moreover, such amnesties have also
been informally incorporated into modern legal systems, wherein leniency is
generally shown to individuals who confess their infractions.
The suitability and extent of an amnesty is determined by balancing its
costs and bene￿ts. The costs of an amnesty are generally expressed in terms
of the additional infractions that it may generate. An amnesty implies that
the average cost of committing a crime may be lower, and this may elicit a
g r e a t e rn u m b e ro fs u c hc r i m e s .T h eb e n e ￿ts of an amnesty are more complex.
They include the possibility that the amnesty will cause more stolen items
to be returned to their rightful owners; the possibility that by encouraging
confessions, less resources will have to be devoted to apprehending thieves;
and the possibility that by widening an individual￿s choice set, amnesties will
discourages further infractions by the same individual.
In this paper we focus on the role of amnesties in encouraging the restitu-
tion of property to its owners. We argue that individuals who rationally steal,
2The seminal paper in this area is Kaplow and Shavell (1994). See also Livernois &
McKenna (1999) and Innes (1999, 2000).
2may, ex-post, rationally wish to undo their crime and return the stolen item
to its owner. However, they will not do so unless the penalty for a confessed
thief is substantially smaller than the penalty for an apprehended thief. In
these circumstances an amnesty, de￿ned as a lower penalty for confessed than
for non-confessed thieves, may be socially optimal.
In order to avoid issues relating to redistribution through theft - the Robin
Hood approach - we assume that the valuation of a good by its legal owner
is never smaller than the valuation put on it by a thief. However, because
owners are unable to ensure that their property is not be stolen, some thefts
do take place. Social welfare is reduced because the act of stealing uses up
resources, and because an owner￿s valuation exceeds a thief￿s valuation. And,
of course, owner welfare is reduced because owners lose property through
theft.
Society would therefore be better oﬀ without theft being possible.3 One
way in which all theft might be stopped is by invoking a suﬃcient deter-
rent combined with a credible probability of apprehension. However, as is
well known, there are social and economic considerations that impose upper
bounds on such deterrents.4 Given such upper bounds, it may not be possible
to deter all theft. We show that within this type of scenario, a partial or total
amnesty (or even a prize for confession and restitution) may be a powerful
second best tool in maximizing social (or owner) welfare.
In Section 2 we consider the theft amnesty oﬀered by Biblical Law. An-
3In this our approach is markedly diﬀerent from the self-reporting literature initiated
by Kaplow and Shavell (1994). In this work Kaplow and Shavell view self-reporting as a
replacement for a licensing system. Self-reporting provides an ex-post license, where some
parties who ￿nd it optimal to break the law (by polluting, for example) do so, and then
opt to self-report and pay a ￿ne (buy a retroactive license). This allows parties whose
valuation of the illegal act is high to carry out the act and compensate society. In turn,
the fact that some parties self report reduces the costs of enforcement. In contrast with
the Kaplow and Shavell approach, we consider a situation in which the illegal act always
reduces society￿s welfare. An ex-ante license would never be awarded.
4The assumption that there exists an upper bound on penalties is commonly made in
the law and economics literature, and originates with Becker(1968).
3cient Jewish sources do not oﬀer an explicit analysis of the bene￿ts of a theft
amnesty. However, using a positive approach, the Biblical law of theft might
well have been designed to capture the social bene￿ts of an theft amnesty.
In Section 3 we present a model analyzing the eﬀect of amnesty in relation
to theft, and derive an optimal amnesty rule. In Section 4 we consider re-
wards to confessed thieves in relation to the wider issue of weakened property
rights. In Section 5 we oﬀer conclusions and suggestions for further research.
2 The Biblical Law of Theft
The Torah5 imposes a ￿nancial knass on the perpetrators of certain criminal
torts. The knass, a term that derives from the Greek word censur,6 is de￿ned
in the Talmud7 as a payment that is over and above the damage caused.8 A
particularly well known example of this is the case of theft. Upon apprehen-
sion and conviction, a thief has to make full restitution to the legal owner of
the stolen good as well as pay a knass that related to the value of the good.9
Other cases in which a knass may be levied include the killing of a person￿s
slave, and the seduction or rape of a woman.10
It is important to note that Jewish law imposes very stringent require-
ment for conviction. To convict it is necessary to obtain the testimony of
two witnesses who either actually observed the crime being committed or
5The Torah, the Pentateuch, consists of the ￿ve books of Moses, which, according to
Jewish tradition, were written by God. In view of this, the Torah is the most fundamental
a n ds a c r e do fJ e w i s hL a wt e x t s .
6This word has clear connection to related concepts in modern English such as censor
and censure.
7The Talmud, which was written in the ￿rst and second centuries A.D. is a vast legal
text that consists of the Rabbinic interpretations and discussions of the Torah.
8Tractate Ketubot page 9a.
9￿If the thief be caught, he shall pay double￿, , and, ￿if a man steals a sheep and
slaughters or sells it, he shall pay ￿ve-fold for cattle, and four-fold for sheep￿ (Exodus 22,
6 and 8). Note that similar concepts, such as double (or treble) damages or punitive
damages, exist in modern law.
10In ancient times such crimes were essentially regarded as crimes against property.
4w h o s ee v i d e n c ei m p l i e st h a tt h ea c c u s e dmust have committed the crime. In
other words, the ￿beyond a reasonable doubt￿ paradigm is not suﬃcient for
conviction in Jewish Law. At the same time, a confession by an individual
is unambiguously suﬃcient for conviction, since a confession is ￿as a hundred
witnesses￿.11
Notwithstanding the gravity with which a court views a person￿s confes-
sion, Jewish law tends to be more lenient with individuals who confess than
with others: The knass (though not the restitution) is waived if the person
confesses in front of a court,12 and is thereby convicted.13 Thus, a person who
confesses to a theft and returns the stolen item of his own volition does not
have to pay a knass. The waiving of the knass is deduced from the wording
of the Torah in this case. The text states that a ￿ne should be imposed on
at h i e fw h o mt h ejudges ￿nd guilty (asher yarshiun elohim).14 This is taken
by the Sages15 to imply that a thief whose conviction emanates from himself
rather than the court i.e. a thief who confesses his crime of his own free will,
is not subject to a knass.
Indeed, in Tractate Bava Kama 14b, the Sages emphasize that the waiver
of a knass is not easily overridden. The robustness of the waiver is such that
once an individual has confessed he is not liable to a knass,e v e ni fi tl a t e r
transpires that he would have been convicted of the crime independently
of his confession. If, after the individual confesses and makes restitution,
witnesses of his act are found, he is, nonetheless, not liable to a knass.16
11See, for example, Tosefta, Bava Mezia, chapter 1.
12Maimonides insists that the only confession that enables a person to avoid a knass is
one that is made in front of a Bet-Din (a court).
13See Bava Kama pages 64b and 75a for a discussion of this principle, which is known
as mode be-knass patur (he who confesses in a case involving a potential knass is exempt
from a knass).
14Exodus 22:8.
15The Sages is a generic title for the early compilers of Jewish Law. Basing their work
on an oral law (which, according to Jewish tradition, was transmitted together with the
Torah at Mount Sinai), they interpreted the Torah and mapped it into a legal code.
16While this is the accepted law, it is subject to dissenting opinions. See Bava Kama,
ibid.
5The model presented in the next section suggests that, in the face of the
diﬃculty of obtaining a conviction and the concomitant return of property
to its legal owner, Jewish Law attempts to encourage voluntary confessions.
Speci￿cally, exempting an individual from a knass may increase economic
(and even owner) welfare. Indeed, under certain circumstances, welfare may
rise even if a thief is not forced to return the full value of the stolen article
i.e. if he is given a legal reward for reporting his crime.
3A M o d e l
A society consists of a group of potential thieves and of a group of individuals
(owners) each of whom owns a single stealable article. The mass of the group
o ft h i e v e si su n i t y ,a si st h em a s so fo w n e r s .E a c hp o t e n t i a lt h i e fh a sa c c e s st o
as i n g l es p e c i ￿c article: owners and potential thives are matched and thieves
do not crowd each other out. The value of each item to its rightful owner
is unity, but as a result of the limited saleability of stolen items and other
transaction costs, the value of the item, b, to a thief is a random variable
whose density function is h(b) such that 1 ≥ b ≥ 0. A potential thief does
not know b at the time of the theft, though he does discover b once the theft
has been carried out. All individuals are risk-neutral.
In order to carry out a theft an individual has to incur an individual-
speci￿cc o s tm. The population density function of m is k(m), such that
1 ≥ m ≥ 0. Each individual knows his m before engaging in theft. The
probability of a theft being successful (i.e. of the thief actually eﬀecting a
transfer of the article to himself), is p. If an individual keeps a stolen good he
risks being caught with a probability q. If he is caught he is forced to return
the stolen item and to pay a ￿ne, f. Alternatively, the individual may choose
to return the item voluntarily. If he does so he returns the stolen item, and
pays a ￿ne, g,( f>g ), where g may be negative (in which case it constitutes
ar e w a r d ) .A l l￿nes (and rewards) are paid to (by) the owner.
63.1 A Potential Thief
We begin the analysis by considering the bene￿t of a to a thief of having
engaged in a successful theft. Once the value to the thief of a successful theft
has been calculated we consider the circumstances under which a potential
thief ￿nds it worthwhile to engage in theft.
The thief ascertains the value, b, of a stolen article after eﬀecting its theft.
If he keeps the article he obtains a bene￿te q u a lt o(1−q)b−qf. If he returns
the item he pays a ￿ne equal to g. Hence, he keeps the item if and only if
(1 − q)b − qf > −g ⇒ b>
qf−g
1−q = b∗.17 Thus, his bene￿t from a stolen item
equals (1 − q)b − qf if b>b ∗, and equals −g if b ≤ b∗. The proportion, r, of
stolen items that are returned is therefore given by the proportion of items













implying that as the ￿ne imposed on returns gets larger, less returns occur.
Hence, once he is in possession of a stolen article (but before knowing its







((1 − q)b − qf)h(b)db, (3)
= H(b




17Throughout this paper we assume that some but not all stolen items are returned.
This implies that 1 >
qf−g





∗) < 0. (4)
The possibility of returning a stolen article is an option which raises the
utility of a successful thief. An increase in the ￿n ei m p o s e du p o ns u c hr e t u r n s
decreases the value of this option, and thereby reduces the (successful) thief￿s
welfare.
We are now in a position to determine the conditions under which a
potential thief will actually attempt to engage in theft. Recall that the
probability that an individual who attempts a theft succeeds in this attempt
is p, and that the cost of engaging in theft is m. The individual￿s bene￿t
in engaging in theft therefore equals s − m with probability p and −m with
probability 1−p. An individual￿s expected bene￿t from engaging in theft is,
therefore,
t = −m + ps = −m + p[H(b




Since the alternative to engaging in theft is a bene￿tt h a te q u a l s0, the
marginal thief will be characterized by t =0 . Thus, the cost of engaging in
theft for the marginal thief will be m∗, where
m
∗ = ps = p[H(b




Now, the proportion, ρ, of the population of potential thieves who actually


















where K is the cumulative density function of m.
The eﬀects of an increase in the ￿ne imposed on a confessed thief can
be summarized as follows. From (4) we have that ∂s
∂g < 0. An increase in g
obviously reduces the bene￿t of a successful theft. In turn, this reduces the
expected bene￿t of an attempted theft, so that, for a given m, the value of t
declines with an increase in g. Hence, the maximum value of m for which a




0. Thus, the proportion, ρ, of potential thieves who actually engage in theft,










3.2 The Group of Potential Thieves
The group of potential thieves consists of a proportion ρ who actually engage
in theft, and a proportion 1−ρ who choose not to engage in theft. The actual
thieves consist of all potential thieves for whom the cost of stealing m ≤ m∗.
Hence, since the expected utility of a speci￿ca c t u a lt h i e fi st = ps − m, the












Thus, since the proportion of potential thieves who actually engage in theft
is ρ = K(m∗), the average expected utility of a potential thief is
Vt ≡ ρﬂ t =
Z m∗
0
(ps − m)k(m)dm. (10)
9The eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h e￿ne, g, i m p o s e do nac o n f e s s e dt h i e fo nt h e















∂g < 0 and ps = m∗, ∂Vt
∂g < 0. An increase in g unambiguously
reduces the welfare of potential thieves.
3.3 The Owners
Consider now the welfare of an owner of an article. If the article is not stolen,
the owner￿s utility is un =1 , i.e. the value of the article. This occurs if, (a),
the article￿s potential thief decides not to engage in theft, which happens with
probability 1 − ρ, or if, (b), the theft is attempted but fails, which happens
with probability ρ(1 − p). The probability that the article is not stolen is,
therefore, 1 − ρ + ρ(1 − p)=1− ρp.
If the good is stolen, which happens with probability ρp, there are three
possible outcomes. The ￿rst, which happens with a probability r, is that the
item is returned. This yields the owner a utility equal to the value of the
article minus the costs of incurring a theft,19 δ where (1 > δ ≥ 0), plus the
￿ne paid by the thief upon returning the article. The owner￿s utility in this
case is ur =1−δ+g. The second possibility is that the item is not returned
but that the thief is caught. In this case, which occurs with probability
(1−r)q, the utility of the owner equals the value of the article, unity, minus
the transactions cost, δ, plus the ￿ne levied on a captured thief, f.T h e
owner￿s utility is uc =1− δ + f. The third possibility is that the item is
19These involve interaction with law enforcement agencies, foregone use, etc. For sim-
plicity we assume that the owner costs associated with an item voluntarily returned, or one
that is retrieved from a captured thief, are the same. Note, moreover, our main results
are strengthened if we make the very plausible assumption that owner costs associated
with a voluntarily returned item are smaller than the costs associated with an item that
is retrieved.
10not recovered. This occurs with probability (1 − r)(1 − q) and provides the
owner with utility unr =0 .
Thus, once it has been stolen, the expected utility to an owner of an
article, us, is, therefore,
us = rur +( 1− r)quc +( 1− r)(1 − q) • 0=r(ur − quc)+quc (12)
= r[(1 − δ)(1 − q)+g − qf]+q(1 − δ + f)
Clearly, the expected utility, Vo, of an owner is the weighted average of his
utility if the item is stolen and if it is not. Thus,











As per the above discussion,
∂ρ
∂g < 0. An increase in the ￿ne payable upon
returning a stolen item deters theft and therefore reduces the cost threshold
for which individuals engage in theft. Hence, since un − us is positive, the
￿rst term in ∂Vo











∂g =1 , the ￿rst term in (15) equals r (> 0). An increase in the ￿ne
paid to the owner by the thief upon returning a stolen article provides a higher
utility to the owner when the article is returned. The second term in(15),
ur − quc, is the diﬀerence between the owner￿s utility upon the voluntary
return of the article and his expected utility if the item is not voluntarily
returned. It it seems reasonable to assume that g will be given a value such
11that the owner prefers that the item is voluntarily returned.20 Hence, since
∂r
∂g < 0, t h es e c o n dt e r mi n( 15) is negative. Thus, an increase in g may raise
or reduce reduce the owner￿s utility. A reduction in the ￿ne or an increase
in the reward payable to a confessed thief, may therefore bene￿tt h ea v e r a g e
owner. Moreover, from (11) a thief￿s utility necessarily rises if g is reduced.
Thus, social welfare may unambiguously rise when the ￿ne imposed upon a
confessed thief is reduced, (or the reward for a confessed thief is increased).
Denote social welfare by W = αVo +( 1− α)Vt, where 1 > α ≥ 0 is the
weight given to the utility of potential thieves. Then, if ∂W
∂g < 0 at g =0 ,
maximizing social welfare requires that g be negative, i.e., that a reward be
given to a confessed thief
3.4 A Numerical Example
The implications of our model may be illustrated with a numerical example.
Let h(b) be a uniform distribution supported by [0,1]. Then the proportion















so that the expected bene￿t of engaging in theft is






] − m (18)









20This imposes a limit on g that is implicit in the condition (1−q)(1−δ)+(g−qf) > 0.
12Setting f =1and q =0 .1 yields that r =0 .1111 − 1.1111g, that
s =0 .5556(0.1 − g)
2+0.35, and that m∗ = p[0.35556−0.11112g+0.5556g2].
To analyze the average behavior of potential thieves assume that k(m)
is an independent uniform distribution supported by [0,1]. This implies that
the average cost incurred by an actual thief is m∗/2 .B u t f r o m ( 19), the
(gross) bene￿t of a successful theft is s = m∗/p. Hence, the (net) average
utility of an actual thief equals








In addition, the proportion of potential thieves who actually engage in theft
is ρ = m∗. Hence, the average expected utility of all potential thieves is













Now consider the welfare of owners given the above assumptions about
the distributions of b and m. The probability that there will be an attempt
to steal a particular owner￿s good is ρ = m∗, so that an owner suﬀers an
actual theft with probability pm∗. If this occurs, the good is returned with
probability r =
qf−g
1−q . Moreover, if the good is not returned it it retrieved with
a probability q. Hence, substituting r =
qf−g
1−q in (12) an owner￿s expected
utility if the article is stolen is
us =











13In our example, f =1 ,q=0 .1. Adding the assumption that δ =0 .1 we
obtain:
Vo =1− p
2(0.160g − 0.726g − 0.253g
3 − 0.617g
4) (25)














Given our parameter values, the condition that 1 >b ∗ > 0, (which can
be written as 1 >
qf−g
1−q > 0), implies that 0.1 >g>−0.8. Moreover, the
condition that the owner prefers a voluntary return to an apprehension, (1−
q)(1 −δ)+(g −qf) > 0, implies that g>−0.71.21 Hence the relevant range
of g is (−0.71,0.1). Clearly, in this range, Vt declines as g rises. A thief is
always better oﬀ with a smaller ￿ne on returned stolen items. In addition,
though the owners￿ utility is a fourth order polynomial in g, it has a single
turning point in this range. As is shown in Figure 1, Vo ￿rst rises and then
falls in g for 0.1 >g>−0.71, reaching its maximum at g = −0.114. It is
clear that, in this case, the owner￿s average utility is maximized if a confessed
thief is oﬀered a reward.
21The condition that the owner does not prefer a theft to a non-theft, 1−us > 0,r e q u i r e s
that g>−0.884, which is subsumed in this inequality.
14Let social welfare, W, be a linear combination of Vt and Vo
W =( 1− α)Vt + αVo (28)
such that 1 ≥ α ≥ 0. For our parameter values the owners￿ welfare is
maximized for a negative g, and the welfare of thieves declines with g. It
therefore follows that maximizing social welfare requires that a reward be
paid to the confessed thief. In Figure 1 W is plotted for α =0 .8, achieving
it maximum at g = −0.132. As expected, if the thieves￿ welfare is taken into
account, the optimum requires a lower ￿ne (a greater reward) than the if
only owners￿ welfare is considered.
From this example as well as from our general analysis it is clear that,
depending on parameter values, the solution to
max
g
(1 − α)Vt + αVo (29)
can be g<0. A reward to confessed thieves may increase welfare. Of course,
the optimal g may be positive (though smaller than f), and it may also be
zero. However, the likelihood that the solving the complicated optimization
problem in (29) just happens to yield g =0is small. A law that provides for
a complete amnesty with no reward is likely to re￿ect wider considerations.
4E ﬃciency and Amnesty
It is clear from the above analysis that many combinations of the relevant
parameters (q,f,δ, α and p) may yield the result that a reward to thieves
is eﬃcient, in the sense that it maximizes owners￿ utility and social welfare.
Figure 2 uses the assumptions made in the last section regarding h(b) and
k(m) as well as the assumptions that δ =0 .1, p =1and α =0 .9,t op l o tt h e
combinations of q and f for which the optimal reward is zero. The optimal
value of g is negative for all combinations of f and q that are in the area
below the curve.
15Figure 2
Despite the fact that a negative ￿ne may be socially optimal, Jewish
law almost never oﬀers a reward to thieves. The best deal that is generally
oﬀered is a complete amnesty with no reward. It seems that even if the above
optimization problem were to yield a negative g, i.e. a reward, g is set equal
to zero. This may be due to the fact that Jewish criminal law follows the
edict that ￿the sinner should not be rewarded￿ -she￿lo yiheye hachoteh niscar.
At ￿rst glance, the motivation for edict appears to be an ethical/moral. The
Torah has decreed that it is a sin to steal, and individuals should not be
rewarded for sinning.
However, we suggest that, at least in the case of theft, this edict re￿ects
a wider view of the social optimization problem. Indeed, the edict that ￿the
sinner should not be rewarded￿ may be viewed as re￿ecting the recognition by
Jewish law of the central role played by property rights within the economic
system. Weakening property rights may have a major negative impact on the
economy. The edict therefore exhorts society to avoid granting legitimacy to
abuses of property rights by rewarding their perpetrators. In other words,
the edict suggests that setting g<0is detrimental to the whole notion of
property rights, even if the absolute value of g is small. A movement from
g =0to a negative g therefore implies a host of costs that are absent as long
as g ≥ 0. Hence, economy-wide welfare is kinked at g =0 .
Of course, there may be special circumstances where the achievement of
speci￿c social goals may outweigh a potential weakening of property rights.
Indeed, notwithstanding the above, ancient Jewish Law explicitly permits
t h ep a y m e n to far e w a r dt ou s u r p e r so fp r o p e r t yr i g h t si nt w oc a s e s . T h e
￿rst is known as the sicaricon law, and relates to purchase of stolen land.
The second, pidyon shvuim, relates to the redemption of hostages/captives.
In the discussion below we suggest that these two cases are the exceptions
that prove the rule.
16The Sicaricon Law:T h es e v e n t hd e c a d eo ft h e￿rst century A.D. was a
tumultuous time in the land of Israel, Which was occupied by the Romans
who faced on-going resistance from parts of the local Jewish population.
There was little legal protection of property rights. This resulted in the
sicaricon phenomenon, in which armed individuals (sicae is the Latin word
for a knife or a small sword) took over land belonging to Jews and resold it.
The rabbinical authorities had to determine whether a person who bought
land from a sicaricon possessed full property rights over the land and whether
he was required to compensate its original owner. The talmud (Tractate
Gitin, page 55b) recounts the evolution of the (Jewish) law regarding this
issue. Initially, in the seventh decade of the ￿rst century, the rabbis ruled
that no compensation to original owners was payable, and that the buyer is
the new legal owner. The implication of this was that the sicaricon got a
good price for the land they stole. This ruling should be viewed against the
backdrop of the anarchy in the land of Israel in this period. The probability, q,
that usurped land could be retrieved by its original owner through the courts
was negligible. Law enforcement became more eﬀective after the conquest
of Jerusalem by the Romans in 70 A.D. In response, Jewish law swung the
other way. The land￿s original owner was declared maintained his property
rights over the land. This meant that no one other than the original owner
could acquire property rights over the land. This ruling may have too harsh,
since the sicaricon could still sell land to non-Jews. As a result the law was
changed again. Any Jew could buy land from a sicaricon, but had to pay 25%
of his pro￿t (which was estimated to be the diﬀerence between the market
value of the land and the price paid to the sicaricon) to the original owner.
pidyon shvuim: After the conquest of the land of Israel by the Syrians in
175 B.C., roaming bands began to capture Jews and sell them into slavery.
This phenomenon intensi￿ed under the rule of the Romans in the ￿rst century
A.D. .Rabbinical authorities viewed the payment of a ransom obtain the
release of captives as a major duty of Jewish communities. Indeed, they the
17payment of such ransom to be a community-wide obligation, which was often
￿nanced by the public purse. Clearly, the probability of release without the
payment of a ransom, q, was eﬀectively zero. It is interesting to note however,
that the rabbis did not permit the ransom to exceed the market price of the
individual i.e. his price if sold into slavery This limitation was in eﬀect even
in cases where an individual was willing to pay an higher amount . As the
talmud explicitly recognizes (Tractate Gitin, page 45a) this restriction on
ransom payments ensured that kidnappers do not make a special investment
in capturing Jews. Given that kidnappers only obtain the market price of a
slave, they will ￿n dt h ek i d n a p p i n go fJ e w sw i l lb en om o r ep r o ￿table than
the capturing of others. In view of this kidnappers would not speci￿cally
target Jews, thereby reducing the burden on the Jewish community.22
It is clear from the above examples that ancient Jewish Law recognized
the social costs and bene￿ts of rewarding thieves. However, in normal cir-
cumstances the edict that ￿the sinner should not be rewarded￿ was viewed as
binding. In particular, in the case of theft, maximizing eﬃciency subject to
this edict yielded a complete amnesty with no reward.
5 Concluding Comments
This paper explains the existence of theft amnesties by viewing them as
a way of minimizing the social costs related infractions of property rights.
Clearly, any case where the penalty imposed on confessed thieves is lower than
that imposed on non-confessed thieves, constitutes an eﬀective amnesty. An
amnesty is therefore de￿ned by f>g,w h e r eg may be positive, zero or
negative. The optimal size of g is determined by considering its costs and
bene￿ts. An amnesty carries with it the bene￿tt h a ti te n c o u r a g e st h i e v e s
22In the cases sicaricon and hostage taking the crimes (sins) were committed by non-
Jews. A possible interptretation fact that a reward to these crimes is permitted, is that it
did not encourage Jews to participate in such crimes.
18to return stolen items to their rightful owners. At the same time, however,
it carries the cost that it encourages theft. The tension between these two
eﬀects of an amnesty determines whether it should be oﬀered and, if it is,
what the extent of the amnesty should be.
These issues appear to have been considered in ancient times, and our
analysis is shown to be directly applicable to biblical times. It appears that
biblical law struck the balance between encouraging theft and encouraging
returns by waiving the ￿ne but oﬀe r i n gn or e w a r df o rc o n f e s s e dt h e f t .H o w -
ever, while the discussion was motivated by the biblical law of theft, the
model presented may be of use in several modern contexts. For example, it
may shed light on laws relating to negotiations with kidnappers, or whether
insurance companies should be allowed to negotiate with car thieves for the
return of stolen cars.
Indeed, the principle upon which the Biblical law of theft seems to be
based is commonly employed in the legal system. Courts frequently oﬀer
leniency to confessed oﬀenders, though they seldom if ever oﬀer rewards.
One possible interpretation of such leniency may be couched in terms of
the publicly-borne costs of achieving a conviction. We oﬀer an alternative
explanation that hinges on restitution.
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